Monitor is in its infancy, but, pardon the pun, I would like to describe an example of childbirth to explain the mountain of problems that the new privatised NHS is yet to experience. Consider this a steep learning-curve that not many of us voted for at the last election.
“The new NHS provider licence: consultation document” was issued by Monitor on 31 July 2012 with a deadline for responses determined as 23 October 2012. According to section 5.1 of this Document on pricing,
“One of Monitor’s new functions will be to set prices for health care services funded by the NHS.Accurate pricing is essential to ensure that providers are paid appropriately for services they provide to patients. Accurate pricing information helps GPs, commissioners and providers to plan and budget for health care services to meet people’s needs. Pricing can also be used to encourage providers to improve the quality of services for patients, and to increase the efficiency with which services are provided. If providers are not properly reimbursed, this can reduce the quality and efficiency of care they offer and may, in some circumstances, threaten the sustainability of their services.”
Pricing is pivotal in markets, and will obviously therefore be expected to the subject of considerable scrutiny by competition regulatory authorities. In future, Monitor will be responsible, in partnership with the NHS Commissioning Board, for setting prices for NHS services.Indeed, according to a statement produced on 20 June 2012,
“The Health and Social Care Act 2012 makes changes to the way health care is regulated in order to strengthen the way patients’ interests are promoted and protected. Monitor’s role will change significantly as we take on a number of new responsibilities. We will become the sector regulator for health care, which means that we will regulate all providers of NHS-funded services in England, except those that are exempt under secondary legislation.”
Take for example the cost to the taxpayer of a provider delivering a baby – not the antenatal or postnatal packages, but the cost of the actual labour and peri-partum process (“the package”). Like any other “product” in the market, a supplier will have to price its product carefully, to ensure that it offers a competitive price, but especially to ensure it does not price itself out of the market by being too costly. The price of “the package” might be determined through a number of different ways.
- Premium pricing (also called prestige pricing) is the strategy of consistently pricing at, or near, the high end of the possible price range to help attract status-conscious consumers. People might buy a premium priced product because they believe the high price is an indication of good quality.
- Cost-plus pricing is the simplest pricing method. The firm calculates the cost of producing the product and adds on a percentage (profit) to that price to give the selling price. This method although simple has two flaws; it takes no account of demand and there is no way of determining if potential customers will purchase the product at the calculated price. You only need to consider the complexity of doing the calculation for the package”, e.g. will the provider use cheap epipdural needs for the anaesthesia, will a foundation year doctor (who is cheaper) perform most of the medicine compared to a specialist registrar (who is more expensive, but more experienced, especially in dealing with medical emergencies).
- Value-based pricing – a price based on the value the product has for the customer and not on its costs of production or any other factor.. The relevant issue is how much would you be prepared to have provider A deliver your baby? This is a subjective issue, not easy to predict.
The problem with premium pricing is that providers can collude lawfully to set their prices as high as possible between them. Price fixing is illegal under Article 101 TFEU of the European Union:
Article 101
(ex Article 81 TEC)
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
– any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
– any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
– any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
It has been incredibly hard to prove price-fixing, but numerous examples exist.
For example, the Daily Mail recently reported price-fixing at the petrol pumps:
“Motorists are being ripped off by profiteering oil companies and speculators, MPs suggested yesterday.They demanded an inquiry into allegations of price-fixing at the pumps, and called for the Government to replace its planned fuel duty rise with a windfall tax on oil company profits.
And last year they reported on the price-fixing of milk:
“Supermarkets and dairy firms have been fined almost £50million over price rigging on milk and cheese that cost families £270million. The collusion put up the price of milk by 2p a litre – 1.2p a pint – and added 10p to the cost of a 500g block of cheese. The punishment was announced by the Office of Fair Trading, following an investigation triggered by whistle blowers at the Arla dairy company. First revealed by the OFT in 2007, the ‘Great Milk Robbery’ took place in 2002 and 2003. But only now has a fine of £49.51million been handed down.”
For Monitor, regulating this will be a mammoth task. Private health providers have much scope for setting between them the most profitable way of delivering the patient’s baby, and it is a great market to be in: the country will never be short of a need for providers of safe deliveries of babies. Whilst other metrics might be important to the clinician, such as mortality or morbidity (infection rates), it could be that private providers are distinguished most themselves by the least cost to a GP practice. Or, it could be that people are genuinely fickle about not caring about who picks up the tab, but the preferred private provider might provide “extra frills”, like en-suite TV with 80 channels.
The problematic issue is what happens if an unconventional problem comes out-of-the-blue. The mother might experience a rare type of headache, such as trigeminal autonomic neuralgia, and there is effectively no “patient choice” involved, save for the GP having to refer the patient to a specialist unit like Great Ormond Street Hospital. You will notice here that the quality of patient choice is nothing to do with the innovation of the private health provider, nor indeed how “competitive” the market of private providers of childbirth is: it is entirely to do with the skill of the clinician in making a rare diagnosis, and having the astuteness of having a specialist unit such as Great Ormond Street Hospital deal with it safely, whatever the cost. You must note that I give this example of TAN at GOSH completely at random, and any similarity to a real-life scenario is of course completely unintentional.
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